Graduation Year

Spring 2013

Document Type

Open Access Senior Thesis

Degree Name

Bachelor of Arts



Reader 1

Eric Hughson

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Rights Information

© 2013 Peter Kimmey


This paper examines shareholder disapproval of CEO compensation as expressed through their advisory vote on executive compensation (say-on-pay) as required by Section 951 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Using a sample of 884 votes by S&P 500 firms in 2011 and 2012, I find that higher CEO salary, a weak link between pay and performance, and higher dilution from stock option grants are associated with lower say-on-pay approval. In addition, I find evidence that shareholders are sophisticated in their examination of CEO compensation by voting against excess compensation over what is deserved due to performance and other determining factors.