Abstract
The concept of belief is analyzed and then discussed within the context of the current climate of atheist distrust in America. To begin, Moore’s Paradox, and its relationship to an important claim made by Wittgenstein regarding false beliefs, is explored. Next, the definition of belief that results from affirming Wittgenstein’s claim is outlined and subsequently defended from an attempted refutation constructed by John N. Williams. The defended definition of belief, which regards direct doxastic voluntarism as false, is then used to argue that atheists do not directly choose to not believe in any gods so as to evade moral responsibility.
DOI
10.5642/lux.201301.30
Recommended Citation
Thompson, Kyle
(2013)
"Moore’s Paradox, Direct Doxastic Voluntarism, and Atheist Distrust,"
LUX: A Journal of Transdisciplinary Writing and Research from Claremont Graduate University:
Vol. 2:
Iss.
1, Article 30.
Available at:
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/lux/vol2/iss1/30
Included in
Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons, Semantics and Pragmatics Commons