Graduation Year

2015

Date of Submission

12-2014

Document Type

Campus Only Senior Thesis

Degree Name

Bachelor of Arts

Department

Economics

Reader 1

Yaron Raviv

Terms of Use & License Information

Terms of Use for work posted in Scholarship@Claremont.

Rights Information

© 2014 Nicholas Weiss

Abstract

This paper modifies the two-player Rubinstein bargaining game to include a third player. Analyzing the game through a dynamic model provides parametric changes that cause a longer negotiation period and fewer concessions from each player’s initial demand upon an agreement. The introduction of a free rider problem and limited computational abilities cause these consequences with the addition of a third player. The free rider problem discourages players from conceding their demands and since players have limited strategic abilities, the additional player requires more effort for players to understand the game and thus more time to understand the environment enough to reach an agreement.

This thesis is restricted to the Claremont Colleges current faculty, students, and staff. It is not available for interlibrary loan. Please send a request for access through Contact Us.

Share

COinS