Graduation Year

2019

Date of Submission

12-2018

Document Type

Open Access Senior Thesis

Degree Name

Bachelor of Arts

Department

Philosophy

Second Department

Philosophy and Public Affairs

Reader 1

James Kreines

Terms of Use & License Information

Terms of Use for work posted in Scholarship@Claremont.

Rights Information

2018 Theodore G Kahn

OCLC Record Number

1089197399

Abstract

The questions of what kind of freedom morality requires and how to reconcile the capacity for free agency within a determined temporal sequence represent the crux of the free will debate. Traditional compatibilists claim that determinism does not preclude our capacity for moral agency. Nuanced determinists, such as Derk Pereboom, deny the existence of moral agency and argue that free will is not required to save the basic modes of our practical lives, such as our capacity to affect each other and to lead practically morallives. I will argue in favor of Kant’s view, which holds that since freedom and moral agency is metaphysically possible we cannot deny the possibility of free will and morality. The object of this thesis is to argue for why Kant’s position holds an advantage over determinism and compatibilism; it is not necessarily to argue for Kant’s argument, although I do explain and argue for aspects of it in support of my broader goal of establishing the superiority of Kant’s account.

Included in

Metaphysics Commons

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