Marriage and Consumption Insurance: What’s Love Got to Do with It?

Authors

Gregory Hess, Claremont McKenna CollegeFollow

Document Type

Article

Department

Economics (CMC)

Publication Date

4-2004

Abstract

When markets are incomplete, individuals may choose to marry to diversify their labor income risk. Love, however, can complicate the picture. If love is fleeting or the resolution of agents’ income uncertainty occurs predominantly later in life, then marriages with good economic matches last longer. In contrast, if love is persistent and the resolution of uncertainty to agents’ income occurs early, then marriages with good economic matches are more likely to be caught short with too little love to save a marriage. Consequently, once married, the partners will be more likely to divorce. Evidence is provided to distinguish between these alternative scenarios.

Comments

This article can also be found at http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/381477

Rights Information

© 2004 University of Chicago Press

Terms of Use & License Information

Terms of Use for work posted in Scholarship@Claremont.

DOI

10.1086/381477

Recommended Citation

Hess, Gregory. "Marriage and Consumption Insurance: What’s Love Got to Do with It?" Journal of Political Economy 112.2 (2004): 290-318. doi: 10.1086/381477