Researcher ORCID Identifier
0009-0009-5053-029X
Graduation Year
2024
Date of Submission
4-2024
Document Type
Open Access Senior Thesis
Degree Name
Bachelor of Arts
Department
Economics
Reader 1
Yaron Raviv
Terms of Use & License Information
Rights Information
© 2024 Nico Pei
Abstract
The absence of market makers alters the microstructure of the market. It’s difficult to get exposed to time-weighted prices in markets without market makers. In this paper, we delve into three mechanism designs – discrete gradual dutch auction, continuous gradual dutch auction, and variable rate gradual dutch auction – to study how to execute time-weighted sell orders on blockchain in a market without market makers. To make it simpler for readers to understand, we imagine an example of helping a close friend of Picasso to sell his 100 Picasso paintings in the next 10 years since 1970, with the private information of Picasso’s illness. The three mechanisms each demonstrate different pros and cons related to the seller’s control over the emission schedule, value capture during demand burst, and premium loss to on-chain validators. We distill sellers’ preferences into six metrics and evaluate each mechanism against the six metrics. We concluded that control over emission schedule and value capture during demand bursts are orthogonal to each other. While discrete gradual dutch auction offers no control over emission schedule, continuous gradual dutch auction offers full control over emission schedule but little value capture during demand burst. Variable rate gradual dutch auction is a middle-point that balances both features.
Recommended Citation
Pei, Nico, "Mechanism Design For Optimizing On-Chain Sell Order in Market without Market Maker" (2024). CMC Senior Theses. 3644.
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/3644
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