Graduation Year

2026

Date of Submission

4-2026

Document Type

Campus Only Senior Thesis

Degree Name

Bachelor of Arts

Department

Philosophy

Reader 1

Gabbrielle M. Johnson

Abstract

Beliefs are a touchy subject. Striking consequences can arise from how beliefs are theoretically conceived. After all, beliefs play crucial roles in our lives. Beliefs about nature guide scientific inquiry. Beliefs about the spiritual and supernatural can constitute the bedrock of worldwide communities. On a more basic level, beliefs serve as motivations for our actions and inferences—they are one of the crucial building blocks of rationality. As a consequence, theories that relegate groups of ideas to the status of non-belief will face challenging entailments. These theories run the risk of dismissing, from the realm of the rational, swaths of beliefs and the individuals who hold them. Tendencies toward this dismissal ought to be carefully evaluated. In this thesis, I examine one theory that has this tendency: Neil Van Leeuwen’s theory of religious credences, expounded most thoroughly in “Religious Credence is not Factual Belief” (2014) and Religion as Make-Believe (2023). I critique Van Leeuwen’s theory in two ways: firstly, I critique it on the shortcomings of its underlying theory of beliefs and secondly, on the grounds of its uncharitable dismissal of religious attitudes. Throughout the thesis, I take up the widely-accepted view of belief as the mental state that aims to be true. In defending this view against Van Leeuwen’s alternative, I hope to highlight some important characteristics of the canonical formulation which contribute to its value as a theory of belief.

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This thesis is restricted to the Claremont Colleges current faculty, students, and staff.

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