Graduation Year

2026

Date of Submission

4-2026

Document Type

Campus Only Senior Thesis

Degree Name

Bachelor of Arts

Department

Philosophy

Reader 1

Rima Basu

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Abstract

Stereotypes and stereotyping are often given negative connotations. When we point out someone is stereotyping, we usually express it as a blame, a reaction that carries negative normative significance, for example, suggesting the behavior is morally wrongful (Tognazzini & Coates, 2025). Yet in daily life, we witness ourselves and those close to us readily applying stereotypes, whether to make quick judgments about others or to crack a joke about ourselves and our social group. Consider two everyday moments: spotting a person in a professional jacket walking absent-mindedly across campus alone, you might instinctively judge them as a professor rather than a student, because this is the typical look of professors from your experience. Or a friend asks why they play piano, and they quip 'Because I'm Asian.” Both of them laugh. Are these instances of stereotyping morally wrong? Are we always blamed for applying stereotypes? Faced with no simple answer, we are tempted to dismiss stereotyping as a topic that is too sophisticated and too broad for us to discuss. But constant dismissal leaves us feeling bewildered, cognitively dissonant, and unsure about our own moral standing.

I argue that stereotypes and stereotyping tend to carry genuine moral implications, and that careful and open examination of them is therefore necessary. In this paper, I begin with a literature review addressing three fundamental questions: What is stereotyping? Why do we stereotype? And what is wrong with stereotyping? For each question, I introduce potential answers drawn from two philosophical approaches: the descriptive view, represented by Erin Beeghly's (2015) theory, and the functional account represented by Gabbrielle M. Johnson's (2020) theory. Both theories provide a nonmoralized and normatively-neutral definition for stereotypes and stereotyping, and the discussion turns to its normative aspects by investigating what is wrong with stereotyping.

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Following the literature review, I introduce a series of cases that showcase the full moral complexity of stereotyping. These cases demonstrate that stereotyping can be morally permissible, and at times necessary, or morally wrongful. Wrongful stereotyping also wrongs varying in degrees. Through examination of the cases, I identify what distinguishes permissible stereotyping from wrongful stereotyping, and what factors bear on the severity of wrongness. I conclude that stereotyping is not inherently morally wrongful, and when it is wrongful, there is no single determining factor. Stereotyping wrong in plural ways.

Ultimately, I hope discussions in this paper prepares readers with the mental space to engage seriously with how stereotypes and stereotyping have shaped and continue to shape us and our society.

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