Procedural Support for Cooperative Negotiations: Theoretical Design and Practical Implementation

Authors

Matthias G. Raith, University of Bielefeld, Germany
Francis Su, Harvey Mudd CollegeFollow

Document Type

Article

Department

Mathematics (HMC)

Publication Date

2000

Abstract

We discuss the theoretical design of algorithms for solving distributional conflicts within groups. We consider an algorithm to be procedural if the implementation of the outcome requires the participation of the players, or if it can even be conducted by the players themselves without computational assistance. We compare two procedures for multilateral problems of fair division; both establish envy-freeness, given the possibility of monetary compensations between players.

Rights Information

© 2000 The International Institute for Advanced Studies

Terms of Use & License Information

Terms of Use for work posted in Scholarship@Claremont.

Recommended Citation

M. G. Raith, F. E. Su, Procedural support for cooperative negotiations, Advances in Decision Technology and Intelligent Information Systems, Vol. I, 31–36 (2000).