Graduation Year

2009

Document Type

Open Access Senior Thesis

Degree Name

Bachelor of Science

Department

Mathematics

Reader 1

Francis Su

Reader 2

Kimberly Tucker

Abstract

Let S be a collection of convex sets in Rd with the property that any subcollection of d − 1 sets has a nonempty intersection. Helly’s Theorem states that ∩s∈S S is nonempty. In a forthcoming paper, Berg et al. (Forthcoming) interpret the one dimensional version of Helly’s Theorem in the context of voting in a society. They look at the effect that different intersection properties have on the proportion of a society that must agree on some point or issue. In general, we define a society as some underlying space X and a collection S of convex sets on the space. A society is (k, m)-agreeable if every m-element subset of S has a k-element subset with a nonempty intersection. The agreement number of a society is the size of the largest subset of S with a nonempty intersection. In my work I focus on the case where X is a tree and the convex sets in S are subtrees. I have developed a reduction method that makes these tree societies more tractable. In particular, I have used this method to show that the agreement number of (2, m)-agreeable tree societies is at least 1 |S | and 3 that the agreement number of (k, k + 1)-agreeable tree societies is at least |S|−1.

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